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One of the recent and exciting developments in mainstream art history is its confrontation with
the cognitive sciences and neurology. This study is based on the problems these disciplines face
before they can contribute to each other. We inspect several critical issues resulting from this
encounter, especially in the context of the recently developing field of neuroesthetics. We argue
that it is the language barrier between the disciplines, rather than any fundamental conceptual
divison, that causes the lack of understanding on both sides. Shared terms in arts and neuro-
science are elusive, and the different connotations of extant terms in these separate disciplines
must be addressed. We propose technoscience art as a ground where joint terminology may
be developed, an audience familiar to the concerns of both sides can be formed, and a new
generation of scientifically-knowledgeable artists and scientists can interact for their mutual
benefit.
The aim of art history is to analyze artistic expression, con-
texts, production and consumption of arts from a histori-
cal perspective. Much of art history deals with the visual
arts, and for some influential art historians the psychology
of vision has been an essential critical tool. Yet for the last
decade, art history has been lagging behind the current re-
search on vision, cognitive science and neuroscience. On the
other hand, aesthetics has been an important area of study
for psychologists since Fechner1, and the neural correlates
of aesthetic feelings have recently been explored. This paper
investigates the two-way interaction between brain research
and art history, identifying their common questions and tak-
ing on the important methodological issues that prevent more
fruitful collaboration between these disciplines.
The interaction between brain research and art history
is valuable for art historians, artists, and neuroscientists all
alike. Does it help to understand the mechanisms of a visual
phenomenon to evaluate it in the context of an artwork? If
the answer is affirmative, then the contribution of neurol-
ogy to art history should be obvious. Zeki, for example,
emphasizes that many of the visual phenomena attributed to
the eye actually occur in the cortex (Zeki & Lamb, 1994).
Traditionally, what the artist achieves by directing technical
skills with guidance of intuition and honed artistic judge-
ment can only be evaluated by an equally developed artistic
judgement. This persuasion led to the birth of specializa-
tions like art historians, critics, and connoisseurs. Yet there
is an undeniable search for quantification and more objec-
tive venues of evaluation, to which neuroscience is a very
promising path. Similarly, the production of a new artwork
sometimes involves creation of unique experiences for the
audience, and artists would benefit from a thorough under-
standing of perceptual mechanisms. This is particularly true
in the case of technoscience art which more often than not
combines several perceptual modalities and in which cross-
modal perceptual influences are significant.2. From the sci-
entific side, to use Eric Kandel’s words “it is clear what the
gain would be for neural science. From a biological point
of view, one of the ultimate challenges is to understand the
perceptual processing by the brain of conscious experience
and emotion” (Kandel & Mack, 2003).
The recently developing field of neuroesthetics seeks the
neural correlates of artistic judgement and artistic creation.
Yet the concept of ‘art’ does not have a universally accepted
and stable definition. The language barrier between art the-
ory and neurology further complicates this issue, and there is
a pressing need for some common ground.
Neuroesthetics
As its name implies, neuroesthetics is an attempt to com-
bine neurological research with aesthetics by investigating
the experience of beauty and appreciation of art on the level
of brain functions and mental states. The first publica-
tions on the topic were authored by prominent neuroscien-
tists (Changeux, 1994; Zeki, 1999). Although its method-
ology and research questions suggest that neuroesthetics
should be a sub-discipline of neuroscience, today the topic
attracts scholars from other disciplines as well, including aes-
theticians and art historians. These scholars either collabo-
rate with neuroesthetics researchers, or apply neuroesthetics
in their own research. Especially after the foundation of the
Institute of Neuroesthetics through the collaboration of the
London School of Neurology and University of California,
1 For an account of experimental aesthetics in the domain of psy-
chology see (Silvia, 2005).
2 Two perceptual events in different modalities can interact in
non-trivial ways, leading to modification of the sensation in one
modality, or even to the creation of a novel sensation. An exam-
ple is the famous McGurk effect, where a persons image mouthing
the syllable “ga” and the accompanying audio signal of the spoken
syllable “ba” produce the sensation of the syllable “da”. For a re-
view of how visual sensation interacts with other sensory modalities
see (Spence & Driver, 2004).
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Berkeley, the interest in neuroesthetics has grown. Confer-
ences held on the topic attract linguists, literary critics, mu-
sicologists and cognitive scientists, but the agenda of neu-
roesthetics is set mostly by neuroscientists. We distinguish
between three different approaches followed in the field.
The first approach relies on observation of subjects view-
ing art samples and inspection of the mechanism of vision,
with the aim of inducing general rules about aesthetics. This
is the most popular approach to neuroesthetics, and is cham-
pioned by its godfather Semir Zeki in his book Inner Vision:
An Exploration of Art and the Brain (Zeki, 1999). This study
has reached a wide audience through its ‘plain’ language and
non-technical argumentation and has attracted the attention
of many art historians. In this book, Zeki focuses on famous
modern artworks and artists, comparing the theoretical argu-
ments and styles used by these artists with the latest findings
in vision research. He argues that while viewing modern art-
works, neurons that respond to visual primitives are consis-
tently activated, naturally leading to pleasing sensations. For
instance the horizontal and vertical lines in the paintings of
Mondrian and the movement patterns in the kinetic sculp-
tures of Calder are both perceived early in the human visual
system, as there are groups of neurons responding to these
primitive stimuli. Based on these findings, Zeki also suggests
that artists -in some mysterious way- have some insight into
the structure of the brain.
Another widely-read but controversial paper along these
lines comes from Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999). In
“The Science of Art,” they put forward eight universal rules
for aesthetics. These rules were based on earlier research
in psychology, ethology, and Gestalt theory. Some of them
are known to artists either intuitively or explicitly for hun-
dreds of years, and Gestalt theorists like Arnheim have al-
ready emphasized the importance of these ‘laws’ thirty years
before Ramachandran (Arnheim, 1969). However, according
to Ramachandran and Hirstein, specifying the rules is only a
part of the big question. In addition to this specification, we
must understand why these rules came into being instead of
others (i.e. the “evolutionary rationale”) and we must also
discern which neurological mechanisms are involved in the
realization of these rules. Only then will it be possible to
grasp how this complex outcome of human nature we call
“art” is created (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999).
The second approach aims at establishing the link between
certain brain areas and artistic activity. The followers of this
approach either study artists with neural problems, discern-
ing between their output before and after the onset of the
problem, or inspect the works of artistic savants, whose brain
activation is unusually high in certain areas of the brain. Es-
pecially cases with known and well documented brain dam-
age provide particular insight into neural mechanisms of
artistic creation. Mario Mendez, for example, explores the
stylistic changes in the works of artists with frontotemporal
dementia (FTD) (Mendez, 2004). Patients with damage to
the left hemisphere have demonstrated an expansion in the
artistic (and more visual) abilities of the intact right hemi-
sphere, while FTD patients with predominant right temporal
involvement had difficulties in grasping artistically essential
primitives. Through an analysis of the work of these patients
Mendez concludes that ‘the extraction and exaggeration of
the essence of art’ both reside at the right hemisphere3.
In contrast to approaches focusing on the artistic abil-
ities and creativity, the third approach investigates aes-
thetic enjoyment through brain-imaging experiments on sub-
jects looking at pictures. An example of this approach is
the experiment conducted by Hideaki Kawabata and Semir
Zeki (Kawabata & Zeki, 2004), in which the question is
whether specific brain areas are activated when subjects are
confronted with pictures that are deemed beautiful or ugly.
The criteria for being beautiful or being ugly are not speci-
fied by the experimental setup, and the subjects were asked to
choose neutral, beautiful, and ugly images from a database.
Then they were shown these images whilst in the fMRI
scanner. For each category (portrait, landscape, still life,
and abstract compositions), specialized activation areas were
found; for instance the fusiform gyrus predictably responded
to portraits. But for the perception of beautiful and ugly,
no special area was singled out. Instead, the experiment re-
vealed increased activation of orbito-frontal cortex (known to
be responsive to rewarding stimuli (Rolls, 2000)) for beauti-
ful images, and increased activation of the motor cortex for
both ugly and beautiful images. Based on these results, the
authors argue that the sense of beauty and aesthetic judge-
ment presuppose a change in the activation of the brain’s re-
ward system.
A fundamental methodological crux for all these ap-
proaches is whether the aesthetic judgements are perceived
as bottom-up processes driven by neural primitives or as top-
down processes with high-level correlates. Zeki’s approach
initially tended towards the bottom-up, but changed as he
continued to develop his theory of aesthetics based on neu-
rological findings. In one of his early papers on the subject,
Zeki relates the modern artistic tendency to single out and
emphasize a certain visual primitive in an artwork (e.g. a
certain colour, simple motions, geometric shapes and com-
positions) to the strength of bottom-up activation created by
this intensified stimulus (Zeki & Lamb, 1994). According
to Zeki, what the kinetic artist does when he or she reduces
the visual stimulus to pure motion is to act upon an unvoiced
intuition about the dynamics of the brain.
While this perspective may sound plausible for some mod-
ern art pieces, it is certainly not powerful enough to encom-
pass most of aesthetic experience. The difficulty that needs
to be breached is the huge gap between the primitives and
high-level concepts, which requires operating in several res-
olutions at the same time. While the primitives have been
explored by neurologists with success, most of the high-level
concepts have been in the domain of philosophy for hundreds
of years. Inevitably, Zeki saw the need for objective descrip-
tions of more abstract concepts, and high-level notions like
“beauty” are probed for neural correlates in his later papers
on neuroesthetics, as mentioned. He also arrived at an ex-
3 For other examples of this approach see (Bentivoglio, 2003;
Bogousslavsky, 2003; Otte, De Bondt, Wiele, Audenaert, & Dier-
ckx, 2003; Ravin & Ravin, 1999; Sahlas, 2003; Stewart, 2002).
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planation of art as a by-product of a more general concept-
formation and abstraction function of the brain (Zeki, 2004).
In his article “Neural Concept Formation and Art: Dante,
Michelangelo, Wagner,” Zeki challenges some of the most
influential philosophical notions, including Kant’s claim that
space and time are the fundamental a-priori forms (Zeki,
2004). He reminds us that our perceptions rely on differ-
ent mechanisms that operate in different spatial and temporal
resolutions. Colour and motion are processed by different
brain areas, and are perceived with different speeds. Further-
more, it has been amply demonstrated that very similar sen-
sory inputs can produce different perceptions under slightly
different conditions, indeed, many visual illusions are based
on this fact. Instead, he proposes that the basic mechanism of
the brain is that of neural abstraction. To give an example, a
neuron in the primary cortex area that responds selectively to
a certain stimulus, like a straight line with a specific orienta-
tion, is interpreted as abstracting this information. This abil-
ity of selective processing, when applied to the whole brain,
and to all levels of processing, is powerful enough to lead to
concept formation.
But what happens when we view an object? Even though
we arrive at the idea of an object through abstraction, our
experience “remains that of the particular, and the particular
that we experience may not always satisfy the Idea formed
in and by our brains” (Zeki, 2004). Thus, there is a dif-
ference between the particular we experience and the idea
of it formed in our brain from all previous experiences with
particulars of the same kind. According to Zeki, art comes
into being through the conflict between the particular and the
idea: “A refuge lies in recreating the brain’s ideal in art and
through art. . . The translation of concepts in the artist’s mind
onto canvas, or into music or literature constitutes art. Great
art is that which corresponds to as many different concepts in
as many different brains over as long a period of time as pos-
sible. Ambiguity is such a prized characteristic of all great art
because it can correspond to many different concepts.” (Zeki,
2004).
We should note that here, Zeki refers to the famous cave
analogy of Plato where only the shadows (i.e. particulars) of
the real object (i.e. the Idea) are accessible to the dwellers
of the cave. The relation between the particular and the Ideal
is one of the core questions of philosophy, one that has been
particularly important to aesthetics and art history. Accord-
ing to Plato, artistic expression, which relies on the imperfect
collection of the Ideas through particulars, is a mere imitation
of an insufficient copy. It was Kant who salvaged aesthetic
judgements (and thus, art) from this inferior status by ren-
dering it as a bridge between pure and practical reason.4 In
Zeki’s argument Kant’s a priori notions of time and space
are replaced with a faculty of abstraction that commences at
the neural level, but the path from input-selective neurons to
concept-selective neural structures is only postulated in very
rough terms. When the difference in the level of abstraction
is so great, the primitives lose much of their significance, un-
less they can be consistently and productively linked to con-
cepts. In the case of aesthetics and the search for its neural
correlates, we observe that so far this link has been insuffi-
ciently explored.
Present neuroscientific experimental approaches share an-
other shortcoming. The evaluation of aesthetic judgements
through neuroloscience is mostly confined to visual stim-
uli, for which the methodology is most familiar and most
advanced.5 Yet aesthetic judgements exist in all domains:
the sensation perceived by a painter in front of a beautiful
picture is very similar to the sensation perceived by a math-
ematician reading an elegant proof. A true understanding of
aesthetic judgements can only be achieved by dissociating it
from purely visual stimulus, and searching for its correlates
across many domains. Officially-designated art is not, after
all, the only thing that provokes aesthetic responses. Subse-
quently, new experimental designs are necessary to take into
account different manifestations of aesthetic experience.
From the Perspective of Art
History
The Greek philosophers and the Church fa-
thers have already carefully distinguished be-
tween things perceived and things known. It is
entirely evident that they did not equate things
known with things of sense, since they honored
with this name things also removed from sense
(therefore images). Therefore, things known are
to be known by the superior faculty as the object
of logic; things perceived [are to be known by
the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science
of perception, or aesthetic. (Baumgarten, 1954)6
Sensations in perceptual experience are not
chaotically perceived. Rather they are ordered.
There must be some form that determines this
order of perceptual experience. It is this form
that is the object of aesthetics. (Wessell Jr, 1972)
All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning
is also intuition, all observation is also invention.
(Arnheim, 1956)
According to Rudolf Arnheim, the distinction between
perceiving and thinking is arbitrary, since all mental capac-
ities function as a whole (Arnheim, 1969). Perceiving itself
asks for an active and immediate interpretation, as well as
a reasoning process. Without making a distinction between
objects, contours, colors, and movement on the level of neu-
ral activity, we cannot decipher what we ‘perceive,’ or better
put, what we ‘see.’ Most of the sense data are filtered out in
4 For Kant, aesthetic judgements were primarily about nature,
not art. Nevertheless his theories were of utmost importance in the
history of aesthetics and art history, and are applied for artworks as
well (Hammermeister, 2002).
5 Other areas where aesthetic judgements are put under neuro-
logical investigations are music, dance and theatre (Seeley, 2006).
6 For the importance of Baumgarten in the history of aesthetics
see (Wessell Jr, 1972), for a negative reading of Baumgarten in the
history of philosophy see (Dixon, 1995).
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early stages of neural processing, and only the necessary in-
formation is used to construct a perception of the otherwise
overwhelming visual stimuli. That means we ‘think’ while
we ‘see.’
Arnheim established his theory, which is four decades old
now, by experimenting with basic geometrical forms and
their effects on human psychology. Today, several aspects
of this theory are validated with recent advances in neuro-
science (like the discovery of mirror neurons), and with con-
tributions of scholars from different disciplines who show the
vitality of images in thinking (Stafford, 2004; Lakoff, 2006).
Arnheim’s important contribution is to show that the age-old
dichotomy between seeing and thinking should no longer be
considered as trivially true. Seeing has been associated with
aesthetic experience and emotions, whereas the usage of the
language has been associated with conceptual thinking and
reasoning. In order to ‘reason,’ one needs words, and the
boundaries of language set the boundaries of thought. This
belief in the superiority of verbal communication as opposed
to the visual had an influence in almost all domains of every-
day life, including scientific practice.
The polarization between the intellect (faculties of reason-
ing, understanding, acquisition of truth) and the senses (per-
cepts, feelings, emotions) is a deeply ingrained distinction in
Western thought. For long, there was a tacit understanding
of a preference of one domain over the other: cognition was
held to be superior to perception. When Baumgarten coined
the term aesthetics as the science of perception, he effectively
institutionalized this polarization. However, since art history
was primarily occupied with theories of aesthetics, and dealt
mainly with visual (perceptual) stimuli, it has struggled to
by-pass this differentiation.We could say that in the end, the
discipline has achieved a discourse that effaced this polariza-
tion by going through various transformations.
Contemporary art production and criticism do not essen-
tialize the aesthetic dimension for artworks; the visual as-
pects of the works are not on equal footing with their con-
ceptual dimension anymore. Art is discussed in terms of a
direct association with cultural patterns and cognitive facul-
ties, and its importance in terms of its capacity to arouse deep
perceptual or emotive responses has been de-emphasized. As
David Freedberg notes (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007), late 20th
century art history prefers to disregard the element of emo-
tion in its theories of aesthetics. Today, this disownment of
emotion is so ingrained into the discipline that most of the
contemporary artworks are approached with little attention to
their emotional potential. The goals of the artist and cultural
contexts of the work have become much more important than
the aesthetic dimension of the artwork.7
The triumph of conceptual interpretation over perceptual
and emotional response is the outcome of an agenda that has
its roots in the early 20th century. David Freedberg and Vit-
torio Gallese mark its first strong expression to the publi-
cation of R.G. Collingwood’s The Principles of Art, which
differentiated between the emotive and cognitive aspects of
art, disregarding the former in favour of the latter and equat-
ing art with language (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007). Today,
this view has thoroughly permeated into the mainstream art
history, and many art historians regard art as a text that is
only meaningful when it is in the right context, i.e. when
it is interpreted in connection with its relation to the in-
tentions, thoughts, and culture of its maker. For example,
Noell Carroll and Arthur Danto both argue that artworks af-
fect the viewers not on the premises of visual stimuli, but on
the historical knowledge they are based: the audience can-
not see a work of art without relating it to some knowledge
of art history (Carroll, 1986; Danto, 2001). 8 Art history
thus defines its agenda as a search for the particulars in the
specifics of technique, artistic heritage, and cultural context.
This perspective is directly in opposition with the universal-
ist and reductionist search for neural correlates of aesthetic
judgement.9 This opposition is bolstered by a misconcep-
tion on the side of the art historian about the interpretation
of neurological findings, a belief that a neural basis of aes-
thetics would preclude individual variation. Consequently,
any interpretation that draws on the neurology of aesthetic
judgements must carefully weigh the importance of the cul-
tural aspects of artistic experience against the physical con-
straints and principles that are derived from an understanding
of brain functions, in order to be accepted by art historians.
This point is nowhere as clearly illustrated as in Ra-
machandran’s bold statement on ‘cubism’ (Ramachandran,
2001). According to Ramachandran, certain art forms are
necessarily aesthetically pleasing, because they are com-
posed of visual primitives like uniform colours, symmetry,
lines and corners that activate lower tiers of the visual system
strongly. For him, it is a consequence of the wiring of our
brains that we like Picasso’s cubist works, and any statement
to the contrary is due to misguided cultural suppression. This
kind of reductionism is anathema to art history, as it greatly
downplays the cultural, personal and conceptual dimensions
of artistic enjoyment. Ramachandran’s approach is also very
superficial about historical specifics and consequently does
not find much support among art historians. If cubism is nec-
essarily pleasing, they ask, then why was it ridiculed when it
first appeared? And why was its period of popularity as a
technique of painting so brief?
For many art historians, neuroesthetics is too reductive
to offer anything to art history. There are, however, a few
scholars that would like to re-assert the relevance of percep-
tion and aesthetics in the interpretation of artworks (Rollins,
7 For the relation of aesthetics to emotions see (Cupchik, 1994).
8 Thirty years after Collingwood, this perspective was firmly es-
tablished by the publication of Nelson Goodman’s Language and
Art. In this influential book, Goodman compared the content of
pictures with narratives and called them “language-like artificial
symbol systems. Both their status as pictures and their contents
are determined by the syntactical and semantic properties they are
deemed by common agreement to have.” (Goodman, 1968). As
Carroll notes, “Goodman reconceptualized the so-called aesthetic
response as a cognitive one” (Carroll, 2002).
9 Another point we should mention here is that universalist and
reductionist approaches are also shunned in the art historical canon,
as these perspectives are associated with the much-criticised ‘white,
male, Anglo-Saxon’ view (Watling, 1998).
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2001, 2003; McMahon, 1999, 2000, 2003; Seeley, 2006)10.
These scholars use recent results from psychology, vision
science and neuroscience to ground various hypotheses on
the roots of aesthetics, without being overly reductionistic.
Seeley notes that for cognitive theories of aesthetics: “one
must distinguish between two uses of the term aesthetics:
one that refers to the processes responsible for the perceptual
content of artworks, and the other, in a more contemporary
sense, refers to what differentiates artworks and aesthetic ex-
periences from their ordinary counterparts. Cognitive sci-
ence can, at least in principle, explain aesthetics in the former
sense. But it is an open question whether it has, as a result,
explained aesthetics in the latter sense.” (Seeley, 2006).
Art history’s criticism of neuroesthetics has not gone
unanswered. Zeki, for instance, responds to accusations of
‘neuroreductionism’ by drawing attention to reductionist ten-
dencies in art historians themselves: after all they separate
“sensation from perception, the perceptual from the cognitive
and the cognitive from the subjective.” (Zeki, 2001). Zeki
quotes a passage from Amy Ione’s commentory on his work
to give an example of what he means under such a seperation:
“[Ione] says that ‘we may get a better un-
derstanding of how our brains interpret the reti-
nal images our eyes receive”. The latter is of
course a view of the organization of the visual
brain championed by Salomon Henschen and by
Paul Flechsig over a century ago, when little was
known about the extent and complexity of the
visual brain, but it was largely abandoned by vi-
sual neurobiologists some thirty years ago. Such
statements show the extent to which a dialogue
between the art historian and the neurobiologist
is necessary. For I would find it difficult to be-
lieve that there are many neurobiologists now
who would go as far as separating the eye from
the brain and the mind when they consider vi-
sion as a perceptual process!” (Zeki, 2001).
This passage exemplifies the language barrier between art
history and neuroscience. The way Ione formulates the per-
ceptual process of seeing an object in the crudest of terms
completely ignores recent vision scientific terminology and
discoveries. This is on a par with Ramachandran’s dismissal
of the contextual aspect of the artwork and of art market’s
power to judge what is and is not art. The issue is not only a
language barrier itself, but a complete unwillingness to over-
come it. Obviously, there is a need for a common ground, a
catalyst, that works for all the relevant disciplines, so that the
language barrier will be naturally and willingly eliminated.
We believe that technoscience art offers the right medium to
bridge the gap between neuroesthetics and art history, as it
uses theories from both cognitive sciences and art history,
and reflects on vital questions of both disciplines.
Technoscience Art
Technoscience Art is a term coined by Frank Pop-
per (Popper, 1987), in an editorial of Leonardo, to cover di-
verse art practices that involve technological inventions or
scientific ideas. As a movement, its history can be traced
back to early 1960s, where the first computer-generated art-
works were put on display. Today, a plethora of names (in-
formation arts, software art, code art, Internet art, robotic
art, ambient art) are employed to tag subbranches of techno-
science art, simply because the idea of creating artworks
at the intersection of arts, technology and sciences is a
widespread endeavour that draws on disciplines like com-
puter science, cognitive science, neuroscience, and even nan-
otechnology.
Technoscience art shows striking similarities to neuroes-
thetics: both rely on concepts coming from sciences and arts,
both try to address a mixed audience that does not share any
common backgrounds, and both are disputed by the main
art historical circles. During the first decade of the move-
ment, aesthetics was an important research venue for techno-
science artists. The combinatorial possibilities offered by the
computer lead the artists to create variations of simple ge-
ometric patterns, and many possible combinations of a sin-
gle composition, from which the most aesthetically pleas-
ing ones could be selected. With this approach, philosophers
like Max Bense (Bense, 1965) and Abraham Moles (Moles,
1966) pioneered the search for mathematical rules govern-
ing aesthetics, and their theories were influential. However,
their attempt to legitimize computer generated pictures as
true artworks was not very successful, as art criticism was not
willing to explore a scientific formula for artistic production.
Thus, technoscience art initially received the same reaction
that neuroesthetics was to receive several decades later.
A number of developments helped technoscience art to
carve itself a niche in the art world. We believe that this
progress could itself serve as an example for bridging art
history and neuroesthetics. In brief, the technoscience art
movement created its own audience, its own specialized the-
oreticians, and publication venues. Once this infrastructure
was in place, the cross-pollination of the disciplines was pos-
sible, mainly through scholars who were well-versed in the
language of art history, and who learned the necessary scien-
tific terminology to follow up with technoscience art. Neu-
roesthetics needs precisely this kind of infrastructure now.
Of particular importance is the journal Leonardo, which
emphasizes the interaction of arts, sciences and technol-
ogy, and which offers a fruitful space for exchanging ideas
on the latest developments in technology and sciences that
are of interest to artists and art critics. The journal has
published articles by canonical critics such as Gombrich,
Arnheim, and Gibson on the psychological explorations
of artworks, as well as works of neuroscientists like Jean
Pierre Changeaux on the relation of aesthetics and neurol-
ogy (Changeux, 1994). Thus, Leonardo provides neuroes-
thetics with an audience familiar with the earlier theories
that link arts to psychology and neurology, in addition to the
mathematical explorations of aesthetics. Furthermore, this
audience is familiar with the terminology of both art history
10 For a good survey of different theories of vision science and
neuroscience that have been used by aestheticians and art historians
see (Rollins, 1999).
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and neurology in general. It may be argued that the con-
tent of these articles does not go deep in either discipline,
yet when compared to an ordinary art historian, the readers
of Leonardo are surely much more comfortable in following
the research in neurosciences and cognitive science.
Aside from serving as a historical example, technoscience
art can contribute to art history and neuroesthetics directly
through its artworks. Artists in this movement questioned
the very nature of artistic production by using computer pro-
grams. The most salient example is Harold Cohen’s artificial
painter program AARON, which has its own coded sense of
aesthetics that it uses in conjunction with an understanding of
composition to automatically create paintings from scratch.
Harold Cohen is one of the most widely recognized elec-
tronic artists, and he let AARON evolve through more than
25 years to its present state of maturity. In his words,
AARON was originally “a program designed to investi-
gate the cognitive principles underlying visual representa-
tion” (Cohen, 1988). In 25 years of its artificial life, AARON
‘learned’ to draw, like a child’s first scribbles slowly trans-
forming into a modernist painter’s stylistic abstractions. The
processes developed by AARON to create its paintings can
be inspected to discover patterns and clues about ‘creativity’,
but not everyone who watches AARON paint will find suffi-
cient evidence to call it ‘creative’. There have been debates
about the definition of creativity, and whether it is possible
to concede that an artificial intelligence (AI) program can be
creative like a painter, or not.11
If there are rules or a procedural description for the artistic
activity, then there is no reason why a computer program can-
not be written to produce art. According to Ramachandran,
AARON does precisely this. Furthermore, he justifies this
claim by pointing out that the art market pays good prices
for AARON’s paintings, and that is a sufficient indication
that they are real art (though, as seen above, he overlooked
such culturally-based criteria in his discussion of cubism).
There are two problems with this argument. First of all, even
though AARON makes use of some basic principles about
the nature of art, these principles are not necessarily universal
and Cohen certainly never claimed that they were. His aim
was not to search for a set of universal principles, but rather
to explore the ideas behind pictorial representation from the
point of view of an artist. Thus, AARON works on the pref-
erences of its creator, and draws pictures similar in style to
Cohen himself.
The second problem is the fact that a good price is not
a sufficient condition for being ‘art’, and this is obvious to
anyone familiar with art history. The fallacy in the argument
is the direct result of the language barrier, the lack of a proper
definition of ‘art,’ which is never formulated as concisely as
a mathematical formula, but rather involves a lot of intuition
and context. Incidentally, the output of AARON is widely
accepted as art, but for totally different reasons. First and
foremost, it is Harold Cohen that legitimizes AARON’s out-
put by being an artist, and by his willingness to exhibit them.
Secondly, the art venues that choose to exhibit them (e.g.
MOMA) associate an artistic context with these pictures. We
must not forget that in today’s artistic enterprise, what makes
a piece an ‘Artwork’ is necessarily different than what made
it 200 years ago. Ramachandran fails to acknowledge the
cultural and political side of AARON’s pictures.12
On the other hand, AARON proves the possibility of hav-
ing a particular artistic style captured by a computer algo-
rithm. Whether the principles put forward by Ramachandran
and Hirstein (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999) are overlap-
ping with AARON’s evolved rules is an interesting question,
but if there are a set of rules for universal aeshetics, it is
likely to be a superset of both. As a Gedankenexperiment,
suppose that this set of rules does exist, and a program is
written to create universally pleasing pictures. The output of
this program can be considered as art, not because it will be
aesthetically pleasing, but because it will have a unique place
in the art historical debates on creativity and aesthetics. As
the Gedankenexperiment indicates, a better understanding of
both art history and neurosciences is necessary to formulate
experiments that produce results useful to both disciplines,
and the assumptions and arguments used by neurologists do
not always reflect an up-to-date understanding of arts. To
overcome the language barrier, it is essential that these issues
are debated jointly by both parties.
Another technoscience art example that forces its audi-
ence to reflect on these issues comes from the curator and
artist Ippolito. In his work Trusting Aesthetics to Prosthet-
ics (Ippolito, 1997), he scrutinizes three programs (written by
others) in order to establish a new way of defining aesthetic
values. The first program is Firefly, which is an Internet-
based program that works like a search engine. It learns the
musical preferences of its users through a set of music al-
bums that the user has to grade from best to worst. Then the
program compares these preferences with the lists of other
users, and notifies the user about musicians that are of po-
tential interest, as well as about the new releases of his/her
favorites. The preferences of the user are stored by the sys-
tem, and represent the aesthetic taste of the user. Ippolito
calls this set of preferences the ‘prosthetic ego’ of the user.
What the program does is a simple comparison of all pros-
thetic egos. It does not have a set of pre-established aesthetic
values, but nonetheless, it is able to make good suggestions.
According to Ippolito, this is a process where the aesthetics
is created on the fly, without any judgments or strict rules,
where only the subject’s position is needed at the first step
when the user trains the prosthetic ego: “No one is in charge,
and theoretically, no one’s taste is more important than any
others” (Ippolito, 1997).
The second program, Interactive Genetic Art, works on
11 For a discussion of the creativity of the tools produced by AI in
general see e.g. (Tijus, 1988; Carrier, 1986).
12 Even though art escapes a precise definition in humanities, it
is often the case in neuroesthetics that a particular reseach agenda
leads to a particular definition of arts. Usually such definitions dis-
regard the conceptual (and thus political and cultural) dimension
of arts and focus on visual qualities. One such example claims
that “the purpose of art, surely, is not merely to depict or rep-
resent reality -for that can be accomplished very easily with a
camera- but to enhance, transcend, or indeed even to distort real-
ity.” (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999).
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assumptions similar to those of the Firefly, but operates with
visual input rather than audio. Interactive Genetic Art does
not operate over the Internet, but runs on users’ computers
in a way that resembles the genetic evolution of DNA. In the
first ‘generation,’ the program displays a number of simple
forms (e.g. circles, lines, and dots) to the user, and asks the
user to evaluate these forms. The user preference acts as the
fitness function, and exerts a selective pressure on the forms
as the program explores the form space. According to the
answers received from the users, the program eliminates the
disliked forms from the next generation. In a few genera-
tions, the program moves on to much more complex shapes,
and eventually to compositions and artworks.
The third program considered by Ippolito is Tierra, which
was written by the evolutionary biologist Tom Ray (Ray,
1992). It is one of the forerunners of artificial life (A-life)
programs, and simulates artificial life forms, which are a col-
lection of programs that reside in computers memory. These
try to create copies of themselves, thereby competing with
each other for a scarce resource, i.e. memory. Writing short
programs that duplicate themselves has been an old challenge
for computer programmers. Tierra is able to evolve programs
that are shorter and more efficient in duplicating themselves
than programs created by experienced programmers. More-
over, there appear virus-like programs that lack a replication
mechanism, and consequently are very short. These pro-
grams can harness the replication mechanisms of other pro-
grams in the memory. In some generations, these programs
dominate the memory, but as the programs on which they rely
for replication get scarcer, they fail to replicate themselves.
Non-linear dynamics similar to actual evolution in a natural
environment emerge, and niching behaviour is observed. For
Ippolito, Tierra turns into an aesthetic-evolution machine. He
proposes to apply Tierra to estimate aesthetic judgments by
running it to evolve programs with prosthetic egos of their
own, without any input from user’s preferences. The idea
is that small programs that have never been in touch with the
aesthetic and social criteria of the academy, aestheticians and
art historians stand a chance of creating an evaluation system
that is not tainted by an abject subjectivity.
These examples demonstrate that art created with a deeper
understanding of science, technology and art theories brings
about a perspective that easily questions the assumptions de-
rived from any single disciplinary knowledge and the sur-
rounding culture. Art historians and neuroscientists have
different preconceptions about the definition of art. One
of the basic assumptions of art history is that art objects
stipulate a certain feeling/condition that other objects can-
not evoke (Preziosi, 1989). Neuroesthetics is based on a
variation of this preconception, it assumes that this feeling
is universal and that it is possible to quantify and measure
this condition with the help of latest technological apparatus
and through scientific experimentation. This is relevant for
neuroscience particularly for the reason that if the emergent
properties of human aesthetics could be dissociated from the
cultural baggage and be studied on their own, they could pro-
vide insights to the workings of the brain. Neuroesthetics
takes it for granted that aesthetic judgment is an innate fac-
ulty of man, yet artists like Ippolito question even this deeply
ingrained idea of art history by taking the human out of the
picture.
Our last example is an artwork that is neither created for
the usual art market, nor to call for theoretical debates or
to criticize the bare assumptions around the discourse of art
and art history. It consists of a simple suggestion that imme-
diately pushes on the boundaries of art as an enterprise. The
idea is straightforward: take a white, ordinary ping pong ball,
cut it into two halves, and lie down under a tree on a sunny
day with these half-balls covering your eyes. The experi-
ence is a homogenous fog-like opaque white colour (called
ganzfeld) that has no equivalent sensation in any everyday
environment. This fog will eventually create interesting sen-
sations, as the mind tries to cope with the lack of informa-
tion in the visual stimuli. In this special setting designed by
Scott Daly, the environment is projected by the shadows of
the trees, clouds and objects around the subject, and adds a
soothing feeling to the ganzfeld sensation.
Ganzfeld is a neurophysiological phenomenon first de-
fined by the German psychologist W. Metzger in 1930, and
often used in parapsychology experiments (Palmer, 2003). A
person in the ganzfeld receives very little visual stimuli, and
Daly argues that what the person perceives is the ‘percep-
tual process itself’ (Daly, 1984). In proposing the ping pong
ball experiment as an artwork, Daly wanted to explore the
entoptic phenomena. These are perceptions generated within
the visual system, like experiencing afterimage affects after
holding your hands on your eyes, or like seeing tiny little
dots after looking at sky for a long period of time. Daly
was excited at the idea of creating an art object, or rather
an art idea, which directly stimulated the brain, and made
the viewer aware of his/her own perception process: “the
ganzfeld, like dreams, is a medium we reside within; exter-
nal influence is minimal. The ganzfeld is simultaneously a
mode for artwork to occur within us, rather than to occur as
a specific object.”(Daly, 1984).13
The creative ideas put forward by artists can open up new
research venues for neuroscience and neuroesthetics. In an
interview for one of the earliest technoscience art exhibitions
(Cybernetic Serendipity, held in 1968), Charles Csuri sug-
gested using brain waves for drawing. He gave a deliberate
and detailed plan of the experimental setup, and hyphothe-
sized that if one could record and digitize brain waves, they
could be transferred to the computer; subsequently one could
command the computer to draw by only thinking about the
drawing itself. Csuri explained in detail how such a de-
vice could be produced, and how a trained artist might get
the computer to draw basic geometrical shapes. The ‘train-
ing’ Csuri had in mind is actually a cristallization of the
thought process to such a degree that the mere thought of the
13 Daly is by no means the first artist who is interested in the ef-
fects of extraordinary stimuli. As early as 1972, Baldwin exper-
imented with similar visual stimuli while creating his kinetic art-
works. He conducted experiments with photic-stimulation of alpha
brain waves to explore the subliminal stimulation of visual percep-
tion (R. Baldwin, 1972; R. B. Baldwin, 1974).
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shape results in a sufficiently expressive wave length, and al-
lows an unambiguous interpretation by the computer (Efland,
1968).14 This idea was futuristic for its time, yet today
research on brain-computer interfaces report the possibil-
ity of such interactions with computers, primarily intended
for people with disabilities (Wolpaw, Birbaumer, McFarland,
Pfurtscheller, & Vaughan, 2002).
The possibility of freeing the communication between the
artist and the audience from the necessity of representation
makes research into neurology of the brain very appealing to
artists. Peter Weibel puts forth one attempt to resolve what
he has termed the crisis of representation. Weibel argues that
technology is shaped by the prevailing sciences of its time.
For an example, he relates the birth of cinema to the scien-
tific understanding of 19th century. In a brief survey on the
history of pre-cinema years, Weibel points out to discoveries
of physiology (e.g. optical illusions, and the laziness of the
eye), which eventually are translated into technology as the
motion-machine (i.e. cinematic apparatus). It follows that
the technology of the future will be based on the scientific
thinking of the 20th century. For him, the important paradigm
shift in this century is the cybernetic understanding of ma-
chines, whose functionality can be dissected into three vital
properties: machines that are able to simulate perceptual pro-
cessing, machines with receptors and effectors 15, and finally
machines that simulate thinking (Weibel, 2003).
The real breakthrough occurs when we start thinking of
the image as a system, and try to achieve a resolution for this
system that will solve the problem of representation. Accord-
ing to Weibel, who calls such an image as the Intellectual
Image, we can achieve the solution if we operate on the res-
olution of neurons. This idea forms the basis of a future cin-
ema, a sort of neuro-cinema. Thus, the technoscience artist
wants to go beyond present interfaces, and have neuronal in-
terfaces16 that are based on neuronal information theory, in
which non-hierarchical, decentralized structures (like the In-
ternet) are employed. In a sense, this is Csuri’s futuristic
view of producing artworks that are directly conveyed to the
brain of the audience, without the taint of an intermediate
medium. That is the artists’ challenge for the neuroscientist.
Conclusion
In this paper we draw attention to problems created by the
language barrier between art history and neuroesthetics, and
propose technoscience art as a venue that stands the chance
of bridging the gap between these disciplines. Interdisci-
plinary research areas like neuroesthetics often face the prob-
lem of addressing audiences of diverse backgrounds, which
manifests itself through the lack of a common technology
and different research concerns. In the case of art history and
neuroesthetics, there is the added complication introduced
by the paradigmatic differences between science and human-
ities. In particular, key concepts like arts, aesthetics, and rep-
resentation do not have concrete definitions that can provide
a solid ground for empirical research.
In this context, technoscience art may serve a two-fold
purpose. First and foremost, it can provide a collaborative
setting that fosters individuals competent in both areas. In-
deed, the need for collaboration lies at the core of techno-
science art, as the first artworks of the genre were born out
of joint efforts of innovative artists and scientists with access
to computers that were so rare at the time. Grounded in this
legacy, technoscience artworks call for an interdisciplinary
terminology. Examples given in the last section demonstrate
that such works indeed push the boundaries of research by
questioning the unquestioned and challenging the assump-
tions, which is the second contribution of technoscience art.
Neuroesthetics suffers from a lack of understanding per-
taining to the relevant issues of the art historical agenda, and
a neglect of cultural and social dimensions that are crucial
for art history. Consequently, its research questions are of
limited relevance for art historians. Another problem of neu-
roesthetics is that it is almost completely confined to visual
stimuli, whereas aesthetic judgements permeate all domains
of experience. On the other hand, art history is plagued by
an unfounded fear of reductionism with regards to neuroes-
thetics. This is a direct consequence of the lack of a common
ground between the disciplines, which this paper aims to al-
leviate to a certain degree.
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